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ABSTRACT 
The analysis of fiscal performance is a hot topic either to policy makers or researchers 
and fiscal discipline is a key value in public finance management at the national and 
local levels. This growing attention to discipline may be explained with fiscal crisis and 
strict resource limitations, since in the three last decades a large part of those 
governments had high and persistent deficits and public debt.  
Fiscal performance may also be an instrument that voters considered at the ballots. 
Elections are the main accountability instrument, used by voters to evaluate the 
incumbent’s performance. Voters elected the incumbents if they consider satisfactory 
their performance; or otherwise they elect opponent candidates. The objective of this 
paper is to analyze relationship between several dimensions of fiscal performance and 
the probability of incumbent re-election, focusing on 2005 municipal elections. Based 
on public finance and public choice literatures we test some well-known hypothesis 
such as fiscal illusion and fiscal conservatism of voters.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of fiscal performance is a hot topic either to policy makers or researchers and 
therefore acquired a relevant position in public finance literature in recent years (Calcagno and 
Escaleras 2005; 2007). Fölscher (2007) refers that fiscal discipline is a key value in public 
finance management at the national and local levels.  This growing attention to discipline may 
be explained with fiscal crisis and strict resource limitations.  
In the three last decades a large part of those governments had high and persistent deficits 
and public debt (Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein, 1999; Von Hagen and Harden, 1995; 
Lagona and Padovano, 2007; Alesina and Perotti, 1999; Hallerberg, Strauch and Von Hagen, 
2007; Velasco, 2000; Kennedy and Robbins, 2001; Millar, 1997; File and Scartascini, 2004; 
Woo, 2003; Schneider, 2006 and Schaltegger and Torgler, 2007). Fölscher (2007) argues that 
expenditure claims would result in chronically high deficits and increasing debt and tax 
burdens if governments were not fiscally prudent.  
In addition, fiscal performance can also be an instrument that voters considered at the ballots. 
Indeed, elections are the main accountability instrument, used by voters to evaluate the 
incumbent’s performance.  Voters elected the incumbents if they consider satisfactory their 
performance; or otherwise they elect opponent candidates (Von Hagen, 2007; Cleary, 2007; 
Martinussen, 2004 and Brender and Drazen, 2006).  
The objective of this paper is to analyze relationship between several dimensions of fiscal 
performance and the probability of incumbent re-election, focusing on 2005 municipal 
elections. Based on public finance and public choice literatures we test some well-known 
hypothesis such as fiscal illusion and fiscal conservatism of voters.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the main theoretical and 
empirical arguments on this topic. In the third section, we describe the structure of 
intergovernmental relations and local government democracy in Portugal, which is the 
institutional setting in which the empirical analysis is based. The fourth section presents the 
analysis and discusses the main results.  
 
2. FISCAL PERFORMANCE AND REELECTION 
In a normative sense, democracy and the representation process are achieved through a 
relationship between citizens and the State that needs to work adequately, granting that the 
necessary distance is not dangerously large. This relationship of accountability resembles an 
exchange process, in which political institutions and politicians need to be responsive to the 
demands of the citizens, which, in turn, have to control that responsiveness by giving their 
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support (Fuchs and Klingmann 1995). This implies that a democratic government receives the 
votes from citizens, applies the preferred public policy, and is trusted and obtains political 
support. This process works this way because public resources are limited and because the 
implementation of a policy rules out the others and its supporters. This is an ideal picture and 
a simplistic explanation. At least, it provides a feasible framework to understand the process. 
In addition, because it is simple, the explanation can be turned into an empirical hypothesis 
that can be tested.  
Concerning financial policies, two different and contrasting views explain how fiscal 
performance affects the electoral behaviour and, subsequently, the electoral results of 
incumbents (Brender and Drazen, 2005b and 2006). The difference lies in the adoption and 
support of prudent vs imprudent financial decisions, with respect to either short or long run.  
The first view – fiscal illusion – argues that voters support financial policies originating high 
deficits and debt meaning that these policies increase the probability of incumbent’s re-
election.  The true costs and benefits of government decisions are frequently and widely 
misinterpreted by voters, creating the incentive to manipulate financial decisions (Maher and 
Johnson, 2008). 
The opposite view – fiscal conservatism – following the lines of Niskanen (1975) and Peltzman 
(1992), argues that electors are not sensible to the adoption of imprudent financial decisions. 
Rather, they are more inclined to sanction the incumbents that promote that imprudence. In 
sum, raising expenditures and running budgetary deficits seems not to be profitable to gain 
votes and remain in power. These two approaches have been subject to numerous empirical 
tests that we review briefly here.  
Three main arguments constitute the approach. The first considers a simplistic vision of the 
interests of voters and incumbents. On one hand, assuming that electors support high 
budgetary deficits, they prefer high public expenditure and low tax levels, enjoying a larger and 
betters amount of publicly provided goods and services, therefore electing the incumbents 
that satisfy those preferences. On the other hand, and taking this characteristics of electors as 
granted, the incumbents adopt opportunistic behavior, adopting those policies that increase 
election probability (Nordhaus, 1975). According to Brender and Drazen (2006), this view 
implies that electors are either myopic or they do not care about long run implications (costs) 
of those present decisions.  
This argument is tested in the work of Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) considering municipal 
elections in Brazil 1988-2000. They analyse whether the probability of election is affected by 
the expenditure level during the electoral cycle. The findings suggest a positive effect. In 
particular, they found that capital expenditures have a stronger effect than current 
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expenditures, suggesting that they are more visible to voters, which means they are more 
prone to manipulation in the years before elections.  
A second argument considers voters as rational and prospective (Brender e Drazen, 2006) 
motivating the fiscal illusion effect. Rogoff and Siebet (1988) and Rogoff (1990) refer that 
voter’s rationality is based on imperfect information because they accept high levels of 
expenditure and/or low tax levels believing that incumbents may adopt this preferred policies 
without running deficits and incurring debt. In sum, they ignore that these policies are 
unsustainable, therefore non-efficient, in the long run. Again, an incentive to use imprudent 
moves.  
The third argument takes away the myopic nature of voters and is based on the electoral role 
of interest groups.  In an attempt to gain electoral support, incumbents try to satisfy the 
requirements of some specific groups.  This strategy is pursued mostly through target spending 
which, in turn, increase deficit. This line of research was tested by Drazen and Eslava (2005b) 
which found positive effects of these target spending.   
The second approach presents several arguments that imprudent policies do not increase the 
re-election likelihood, rather they may end up sabotage that re-election. Supposing that voters 
are rational and informed, they are conscious of the governmental budget constraint and see 
deficits as onerous to social welfare.  Consequently, they tend to punish them in elections. This 
is specially the case of governments that want to reduce public debt, such as Portugal and 
other developed countries (Brender and Drazen, 2006 and 2005b).  
One of the first empirical studies testing the effect of financial performance on election results 
was written by Niskanen (1975). Considering American presidential elections in the period of 
1876-1976, the author observed the relationship between the levels of public revenues and 
expenditures and the incumbents’ vote share.  The results suggested a positive effect.  In 
addition, Niskanen (1975) found that raising taxes also has the same effect, which he 
interpreted as evidence of a tax illusion, that is, voters are significantly more affected by 
changes in tax weight than with changes in the costs of publicly provided resources.   
Concentrating solely on taxes, Happy (1992) analyzed their effect on voting behavior, in a 
design of Canadian federal elections between 1953 and 1988. He tested the hypothesis that 
tax level is not a factor affecting vote. Nevertheless, the findings corroborate the works of 
Niskanen (1975) suggesting an effective electoral effect of tax weight. According to Happy 
(1992), the explanation lies in voters’ concern with their disposable income.  
Focusing on the American elections, presidential and others, between 1950 and 1988, and 
trying to evaluate the effect of public expenditure on vote shares, Peltzman (1992) found that 
citizens do not reward imprudent financial policies. Rather, they punish those acts, which 
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means they are not sensible to major increases in public spending, even with running deficits. 
The author called these voters as fiscal conservatives  
A series of more recent works focusing on local governments deserve attention.  The first by 
Brender (2003) analyzes the effect of fiscal performance on the likelihood of re-election of 
Israel local elections between 1989 and 1998 including three electoral moments, the author 
found that the factors determining vote choice were significantly altered in 1998 elections. 
Contrarily to the previous ones, those elections presented a strong relevance of fiscal 
performance. The author stresses that, if voters are able to control their incumbents 
effectively, they will be punished when adopting imprudent financial practices.  The author 
suggests when voter has access to information due to transparency and effective auditing and 
when tough budget constraints are strict, fiscal performance turns out to be electoral relevant. 
A similar study by Drazen and Eslava (2003) focuses on Colombian local elections in the period 
1992-2000. They consider how different groups of spending affect election results. In many 
ways similar to the studies of Peltzman (1992) and Brender (2003), they found that Colombian 
voters punish the incumbent party that incur in high budgetary deficits. With regard to 
spending, a larger share of capital expenditures increase incumbents votes share, while 
current expenditures have no effect. Globally, these findings mean that voters reward 
increases in investments outlays but only if that is not financed through larger deficits.  In sum, 
voters are well informed and not easy to foolish by means of public expenditure. 
Arvate, Avelino e Tavares (2007) replicates this type of analysis to Brazilian state elections in 
the period of 1990-2002.  They found that re-election prospects are not larger in the presence 
of deficits.  Similarly to Brender (2003), a change in electoral behavior appears to surface 
before 2002 elections.  Facing tough budget constraints, Brazilian electors behaved as “fiscal 
conservatives”. 
The empirical studies just reviewed are all single country studies, addressing national, state or 
local elections. In an attempt to extend the analysis of fiscal performance to different 
institutional (electoral laws and government systems)  and cultural settings (democratic 
traditions), Brender and Drazen (2005b) pooled 74 less-developed and developed countries, 
divided as new democracies and established democracies in the period of 1996-2003.  
Specifically, they were concerned on the voting effects of budgetary deficit in the election year 
and the adoption of imprudent financial policies during the entire electoral period.  The results 
suggest that huge deficits do not alter re-election probability. Moreover those deficits have a 
clear negative impact in the case of developed countries and established democracies.   
The same authors performed an analogous study but focusing solely on the 23 OECD countries 
in the period of 1960-2003 (Brender and Drazen 2006). The results show that raising public 
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deficits, specially in election years, reduces incumbent re-election probability. In sum, prudent 
financial policies have a positive effect on re-election. 
Overall, the empirical tests just reviewed are summarized in Table 1 (see Appendix).  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
 
3. PORTUGUESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
Since 1976 Portugal is a democracy, including existence of local authorities in state 
organization. In fact, the studies developed by Brender and Drazen (2005b and 2006) 
considered Portugal as a new democracy between 1976 and 1987. After that period they 
included Portugal in the group of established democracies, resulting in different 
interpretations of the relationship between fiscal performance and the reelection prospects of 
incumbents.   
By the Portuguese Republic Constitution, local authorities – municipalities – are territorial 
bodies, with representative bodies designed to follow the interests of the local people.  The 
local authorities’ activity is structured by the principles of subsidiarity, decentralization and 
local autonomy. Since our goal is concentrated at the municipal level, the following description 
of the organization of Portuguese local governments and their financial system is focused only 
on municipalities.  
At the organization level, the competences and attributions of municipalities predict the 
existence of two bodies: Municipal Council and Municipal Assembly. The first is the executive 
body and is constituted by one president and a number of councilors depending on the 
number of voters and elected on the basis of proportional representation of party closed lists 
(Hondt Method). The Municipal Assembly is the deliberative body and is constituted by 
members democratically elected also by proportional representation as well as the presidents 
of parishes located in the territory. Nowadays, there are 308 municipalities in Portugal: 278 in 
mainland and 30 in Madeira and Azores islands.  
The structure of municipal financial system is established in a specific law – Local Finance Law 
nº 42/1998 of 6 August
1
.  Municipalities have their own recourses and finances. The model of 
allocation of public resources between the central government and the local governments 
gives municipalities 30,5% of the average revenue of main country taxes (corporate income 
                                                 
1 Actually the municipal financial system is regulated by another law: Law nº 2/2007, of 15 January, but 
we do not consider it since our empirical analysis focus on the period of the previous law.   
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tax, personal income tax and value added tax). This 30,5% is divided in three separate funds: in 
20,5% to the General Fund; 5,5% to the Cohesion Fund and 4,5% to the Basic Fund.  
Concerning municipal indebtedness, the law establishes two limits considering separate nature 
of medium long-term loans and short-term loans. The annual charges with amortization and 
interests payments of medium long-term loans cannot exceed the highest limit of the value 
corresponding to one fourth of funds assigned to the municipality or to 20% of the investment 
expenditure of the municipality in the previous year. In the case of short-term loans, the 
annual average cannot exceed 10% of the revenues of the funds.  
 
4. HYPOTHESIS and METHODS  
As we referred previously, the aim of this paper is to examine the effect of local fiscal 
performance on electoral results of Portuguese municipalities. For two reasons, this is an 
exploratory study. First, there is almost a complete absence of this specific type of empirical 
studies regarding the Portuguese municipal case. Second, the unsolved theoretical and 
empirical puzzles presented in section 2, which renders very difficult the derivation of a clear 
hypothesis.  
 
4.1. Hypothesis 
Our hypothesis subject to test only specifies the relationship involved, without making explicit 
the direction and the magnitude of the effect. 
  
H: Fiscal performance of municipal government affects the share of votes of the incumbent in 
the following election.  
 
4.2. Design  
We followed the approach of Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), which considered only the 
elections years. A cross-section design is adopted to analyze the Portuguese municipalities in 
the election year 2005. Our dataset consists of 308 municipal governments followed between 
2001 and 2005. All data as collected from the National Association of Portuguese 
Municipalities and from the Financial Yearbook of Portuguese Municipalities.  
 
4.3. Dependent variable  
The dependent variable of the analysis is the difference of incumbent party’s share of vote 
between the two electoral periods. We intend to find out whether political parties that assume 
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the power in election year 2001 have a higher or a lower share of votes in election year 2005. 
If the difference party’s share of vote is positive, it means that voters reward the fiscal 
performance of those parties. Conversely, if the difference is negative, its means that voters 
punished the party’s fiscal performance. This strategy of measuring the electoral reward or 
punishment as a difference instead of a binary or choice variable is explained because we are 
also interested in observing elections as instruments of accountability.  Therefore, the 
difference is more suitable to express that continuous, not binary, nature of the variable.  
 
4.4. Model Specification 
To examine the relationship between the fiscal performance and elections results, we test 
whether the electoral fortunes of the incumbents are affected by a set of fiscal and financial 
variables. Municipal debt is limited by the Local Finance Law. In this context of fiscal 
performance the existence of rules that regulate the local credit access is considered a strict 
instrument to the local fiscal discipline (Fölscher, 2007). This limit means the amount that 
municipalities can afford by annual charges (amortization and interest payments) with medium 
and long-term loans.  This debt limit is measured through two indicators. First, we included a 
variable that tests if municipalities overcome the debt limit ruled by law (a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the municipalities overcome the limit and 0 otherwise). The 
expected sign is therefore negative, since it is an indicator of imprudent local fiscal 
performance. Second, we included a variable that represents the level of paid debt as a 
proportion of the debt limit, which represents the debt capacity. The expected sign is 
therefore negative. In addition, to measure fiscal performance we also included annual 
budgetary deficit, with the expected negative sign. 
The structure of fiscal intergovernmental relations also may play a role. The share of own-
revenue represents the municipal capacity to raise revenues and run business independently 
from national grants. At the local level, own-revenue independency is cornerstones of local 
fiscal performance. We expected a positive sign for this variable.  
Spending structure is widely recognized as a major factor affecting electoral shares, with the 
particular case of capital or investment expenditure.  We also included this variable with a 
positive expected sign.  
We also include a battery of socio-economic variables to control for the differences and 
different preferences across municipalities: Cohesion fund, social development index, 
population, population density and ideology.  
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The model is represented by the following regression equation:  
 
Difference in vote share = ß0 + ß1 debtlimit + ß2 debtcapacity + ß3 deficit + ß4 finindependency 
+ ß5 capexpenditure + controlvariables + µ. 
 
5. RESULTS 
The results presented in Table 2 are standard OLS estimations with robust standard errors to 
correct for heterosckedastic problems.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Although somewhat mixed, these exploratory results present some interesting findings. First 
and foremost, debt has a strong and robust influence on vote share of incumbent parties.  
Whether the debt limit is surpassed strongly and statistically diminishes the share of vote from 
2001 election to 2005 election.  This is a long run effect and means that voters punish those 
municipal governments that incur in unsustainable financial paths.  The effect of debt capacity, 
although statistically significant, has an unexpected sign, which renders the result difficult to 
interpret. We can speculate that voters accept debt, for example to investments, only to the 
point that the limit is not surpassed. Of course, more work on this puzzle needs to be 
performed.  
In the short run, the effect of deficit is statistically significant but near to zero in magnitude, 
which means a neutral effect. In general these two effects signal a voter preference for long 
run.  
The amount of capital expenditures is statistically significant but also near to zero, suggesting a 
neutral influence, which is not exactly what the literature suggest and the empirical tests have 
shown.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
If democratic accountability is in place, incumbents need to be evaluated retrospectively.  
Given that public resources are limited, the options facing decision-makers are also limited. 
They have to be accountable for their use of public resources, which means that would expect 
them to be evaluated on their decisions affecting financial resources.  
This study is a preliminary attempt dealing with the Portuguese municipal case.  Municipal 
elections provide an interesting source of variability that allows comparisons.  The main 
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conclusion is that debt limits are considered in voting decisions. While deficit are also 
considered, they seem to have a neutral effect. These suggests a preference for stable and 
sustainable, long-run policies with regard to financial resources.  
Some limitations of this study are clearly recommendations for future research. More elections 
need to be analyzed.  A recent Local Finance Law was enacted, which implied a different 
financial structure and new ways of measuring debt are now mandatory. This regulatory 
transformation is relevant and needs to be addressed.  
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Table 1 – Empirical Studies on the effect of fiscal performance on reelection
Author (s) Unit of Analysis Dependent variable  Independent variable Results Technique 
Niskanen 
(1975) 
USA – Presidential 
Elections 
(1896-1992) 
Fraction of major party popular vote 
for candidate of incumbent party 
Real per capita federal expenditures 
Real per capita federal revenues 
Tax illusion: voters appear to be 
substantially more affected by changes in 
taxes than by changes n the total 
recourse costs of federal services. 
Multiple 
Regression 
Peltzman 
(1992) 
USA -  Presidential 
Elections and non-
Presidential Elections 
(1950-1988) 
Incumbency party’s share of the major 
party vote in a state 
State spending 
State revenues 
State spending from own sources 
State spending from deferral aid 
Higher levels of spending reduce the 
reelection perspectives.  
Pooled Time- 
series 
Cross-sections 
 
Happy 
(1992) 
Canada – Federal 
Elections 
(1953-1988) 
Percentage of the total vote obtained 
by the incumbent party 
Rate of change in per capita personal 
direct taxes  
Negative relationship between taxation 
and reelection. 
Pooled Time- 
series 
Cross-sections 
Brender 
(2003) 
Israel – Local Elections  
(1989-1993) 
1 - Reelected 
0 – Non reelected or resigned 
(localities in which the elected 
major died are excluded)  
Change in debt 
Debt 
Balance  
Statistically significant effect of the fiscal 
variables on the results of the election 
campaigns in 1998. 
Choice Models 
Drazen e 
Eslava (2005a) 
Colombia -  Local 
Elections  
(1992-2000) 
Votes share to party 
Per capita investment spending 
Per capita current spending  
Per capita government deficit 
Higher capital expenditures increase the 
share of votes obtained by the incumbent 
party, while current expenditure has no 
significant effect 
Multiple 
Regression 
Pooled TSCS 
Brender e 
Drazen 
(2005b) 
74 countries – 347 
election campaign 
(1960-2003) 
1 - Reelected 
0 – Non reelected 
(leader is running for reelection) 
1 - Reelected 
0 – Non reelected 
(leader was substitute) 
Change in the ratio of the 
government deficit to GDP in the 
two years preceding the election 
year, relative to the previous 
years 
Change in the ratio of the 
government deficit to GDP in the 
election year, compared to the 
previous year. 
In developed countries and established 
democracies election-year deficit 
spending and tax cuts are punished ate 
the polls. 
Similar results for the effect of budget 
deficits in the earlier years of an 
incumbent’s term in office. 
Choice Models 
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Author (s) Unit of Analysis Dependent variable  Independent variable Results Model 
Brender e 
Drazen (2006) 
23 OECD countries – 
164  election 
campaign (1960-
2003) 
1 - Reelected 
0 – Non reelected 
 
Change in the ratio of the government revenue to 
GDP in the two years preceding the election year, 
relative to the two previous years. 
Change in the ratio of the government expenditure 
to GDP in the two years preceding the election 
year, relative to the two previous years. 
Change in the government revenue ratio to GDP in 
the election year, compared to the previous year. 
Change in the government expenditure ratio to 
GDP in the election year, compared to the previous 
year. 
Increase deficits during an incumbent’s 
term in office, especially in election 
years, reduce the probability that a 
leader is reelected. 
 
Choice Models 
Arvate et. al. 
(2007) 
 
Brazil – State 
Elections (1990-2002) 
1 - Reelected 
0 – Non reelected 
(governing party) 
1 - Reelected 
0 – Non reelected 
(governing coalition) 
Fiscal surplus 
(percentage of the state GDP) 
Fiscal surplus election year 
Fiscal surplus term 
Fiscal surplus national 
(Percentage of national GDP) 
Despite the prevalence deficits, the 
governors did not increase their 
reelection prospects by running large 
deficits. 
Choice Models 
Sakurai e 
Menezes-Filho 
(2008) 
Brazil – Municipalities 
elections 
(1988-2003) 
1 - Reelected 
0 – Non reelected 
Total expenditure (over the mandate) 
Capital expenditures 
Current expenditures 
Mayors who spend more during their 
terms of office increase the probability 
of their own reelection or of a successor 
of the same political party . 
Choice Models 
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Table 2 – Regression Results of effects of fiscal performance on reelection  
 
Variables Model l  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Debt Capacity   
.033** 
(.014) 
--- 
.009 
(.011) 
.034** 
(.014) 
Debt Limit 
-5.332** 
(2.623) 
-2.253*** 
(1.881) 
--- 
-5.256** 
(2.560) 
Deficit  
.000*** 
(.000) 
.000** 
(.000) 
.000*** 
(.000) 
.000*** 
(.000) 
Capital Revenues 
.000*** 
(.000) 
.000** 
(.000) 
.000** 
(.000) 
.000** 
(.000) 
Financial Independence 
-.125*** 
(.046) 
-.122*** 
(.045) 
.110** 
(.045) 
.124*** 
(.045) 
Cohesion Fund 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Social Development Index 
-39.687 
(24.316) 
-37.476 
(24.112) 
-37.975 
(23.929) 
-40.768* 
(24.335) 
Population 
-.000** 
(.000) 
-.000** 
(.000) 
-.000** 
(.000) 
-.000** 
(.000) 
Population Density 
.001 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.001 
(.000) 
Ideology 
-.170 
(.856) 
-0.674 
(.085) 
.170 
(.826) 
--- 
Constant 
30.510 
(21.691) 
29.930 
(21.505) 
29.203 
(21.373) 
31.084 
(21.713) 
Nº Observations 207 207 207 208 
Prob > F 0.0093 0.0196 0.0113 0.0043 
R-squared  0.1294 0.1079 0.1029 0.1307 
Root MSE  0.2046 9.2938 9.3198 9.1928 
 
NOTE: Regressions are run with robust standard errors; 
 The numbers between parentheses are standard errors: 
 *** Significant at the level of .01 
 **   Significant at the level of .05 
 *     Significant at the level of .1 
 
